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For more than seven years Russia has been governed by rulers who
have not been recognized by the United States. Full diplomatic recog-
nition has, however, been extended to the so-called Soviet Regime in
Russia, officially known as the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
Republic, by Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria, China,
Denmark, Esthonia, Lithuania, Mexico, Turkey, Afghanistan, Finland,
Latvia, Poland, Persia, Greece, Norway, Sweden, Hungary, Albania,
Mongolia, Kbiva, Bokhara and the Free City of Dantzig. The New
York Court of Appeals, in speaking of this government in Wulfsohn
v. Russian Republic,:' said, "We have an existing government sovereign
within its own territories. There necessarily its jurisdiction is exclu-
sive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by
itself. This is the result of its independence." In proceedings to
naturalize Russian subjects the executive and judicial branches of our
own government acknowledge the existence of "the present government
of Russia" to the extent of requiring such'applicants for citizenship
to foreswear allegiance to "the present government of Russia.' 2 If,
indeed, we speak in terms of fact, it cannot be denied that this govern-
ment is exercising all the attributes of sovereignty in Russia to-day.
Whatever may be thought of its acts, we cannot doubt its presence,
dominion and power within the territories subject to its rule. People
who live within these territories are governed by its laws, and their
rights and obligations cannot be judged or determined within such ter-
ritories by any other law.
Toward this government the United States has steadfastly pursued,
and is still pursuing, a policy of diplomatic non-recognition. The wis-
dom of such a policy is not a legal question. It is a political question
with which the courts are not concerned, and which is and must be con-
clusively determined by the policy of the executive expressed through
the Department of State. Mr. justice Scrutton, in Luther v. James
Sagor & Co.,' said, "The responsibility for recognition or non-recogni-
tion with the consequences of each rests on the political advisers of the
sovereign and not on the judges." Hence the policy of our government
being one of non-recognition, and there apparently being no immediate
' (1923) 234 N. Y. 372, 375-6, 138 N. E. 24, 25, 26.
'Russian Government v. Lehigh Valley R. R. (1919, S. D. N. Y.) 293 Fed. 133,
135.
[1921, C. A.] 3 K. B. 532, 559.
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prospect of change, it becomes important to consider the limitations
which may, as the result of this policy, be imposed upon the judiciary
in determining questions affected by Russian law.
Precise understanding of these limitations will become of increasing
importance as time goes on. Notwithstanding difficulties resulting from
a state of diplomatic isolation, normal intercourse between people living
in Russia and people living in the United States is being slowly restored
through the channels of trade and communication. Our exports to
Russia during the first nine months of 1924 were $37,4o7,883. Imports
from Russia during the same period were $5,185,285. A single Ameri-
can company, financed with Russian. capital and engaged in this trade,
chartered twenty-four vessels to carry full cargoes of cotton to a Rus-
sian port during this period. During the year ending June 30, 1924,
24,405 aliens born in Russia were admitted to the United States under
our immigration laws. It is to be assumed that such persons will con-
tinue to come to this country to the extent permitted by our laws. Such
persons bring with them rights and obligations dependent upon and
growing out of their residence in Russia under Soviet rule, and it is of
the utmost importance to know whether the laws of the Soviet can be
regarded in determining their rights and obligations when they arise for
determination in our courts. There are pending in our courts to-day
actions brought by Russian corporations which it is claimed have been
dissolved under Soviet decrees, and the important question which will
be decided in these and other cases is to what extent and under what
circumstances may an American court give effect to the lavs of an
unrecognized foreign government with which our government refuses
to have diplomatic intercourse. The question was considered but not
decided in Sokoloff v. National City Bank,4 where it was said:
"Juridically a government that is unrecognized may be viewed as no
government at all, if the power withholding recognition chooses thus to
view it. In practice, however, since juridical conceptions are seldom,
if ever, carried to the limit of their logic, the equivalence is not absolute,
but is subject to self-imposed limitations of common sense and fairness,
as we learned in litigations following our Civil War."
"In determining what is law in foreign territory one must of necessity
determine who is the sovereign. ,Under ordinary circumstances this
inquiry is not open to the courts. In Jones v. United States' it was held
that "who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a
judicial, but a political question, the determination of which by the legis-
lative and executive departments of any government binds the judges
as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of that government."
The reason for the rule is clear, since the conduct of foreign affairs
is committed by the constitution to the executive and legislative depart-
ments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
4 (1924) 239 N. Y. 158, i65, 145 N. E. 917, 918.
a (189o) 137 U. S. 202, 212
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exercise of this power cannot be made the subject of judicial inquiry
or decision.6  These principles have been applied in many cases.7 And
if the executive, in withholding recognition, can be said to have chosen
to regard the regime now functioning in Russia as no government at all,
such determination must certainly be conclusive upon the courts and
deprive the Soviet decrees of any force whatsoever in determining the
rights of private individuals in litigation before our courts. On the
other hand, if the executive, in withholding 'recognition, has not chosen
to so regard the present Russian Government, the question 'discussed
but not decided in the Sokoloff case remains for future consideration
and decision in the courts. Consequently it is necessary to determine
whether the executive has chosen to regard the Soviet Regime as no
government at all, or, while conceding its existence, has merely withheld
recognition and refused to have diplomatic intercourse with it.
This question is fairly answered by the correspondence with Secretary
of State Hughes quoted in the opinion of the court in Russian Govern-
ment v. Lehigh Valley R.R.,s from which it appears that the State
Department, while refusing to. recognize the present Russian Govern-
ment and continuing to have official intercourse- for certain purposes
with the diplomatic agents of the Provisional Government, does at the
same time concede that the Provisional Government has ceased to exist
and that the "Soviet Regime" is now functioning in Russia. It appears
that under date of February 17, 1923, counsel for the defendant in this
action addressed the following letter of inquiry to the Secretary of State:
"February 17, 1923.
Hon. Charles E. Hughes,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. Secretary:
I am asking my partner, Mr. Raoul E. Desvernine, to present this
letter and secure, if he can, such answers as you deem proper to make
to the following questions:
(i) What is the present government of Russia, and its name?
(2) Has such government been recognized by the United States?-
(3) What is the extent and nature of such recognition?
8 Oetien v. Central Leather Co. (1918) 246 U. S. 297, 302, 38 Sup. Ct 309, 311.
United States v. Palmer (1818, U. S.) 3 Wheat. 61o; Foster v. Nielson (1829,
U. S.) 2 Pet. 253, 307, 309; Garcia v. Lee (1838, U. S.) 12 Pet. 511; Willians v.
Suffolk Insurance Co. (1839, U. S.) 13 Pet. 415, 42o; it re Cooper (1892) 143
U. S. 472, 499, 12 Sup. Ct. 453, 459; Luther v. Borden (1849, U. S.) 7 How. i;
Rose v. Himely (i8o8, U. S.) 4 Cranch, 241, 272; Kennett v. Chambers (1852,
U. S.) 14 How. 38; Gelston v. Hoyt (1818, U. S.) 3 Wheat. 246, 324; The
Nueva Anna (1821, U. S.) 6 Wheat. 193; The Three Friends (1897) 166 U. S.
I, 17 Sup. Ct. 495.
" Supra note 2; (motion for leave to file petition for writ of prohibition and / or
writ of mandamus denied (1924) 265 'U. S. 573, 44 Sup. Ct. 46o).
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If, through ignorance of the proper procedure, I have not asked the
appropriate questions, what I am after is to ascertain whether there is
any government in Russia to-day which the United States government
has recognized. My reason for asking these questions is that I am
defending a case brought by the Russian government against the Lehigh
Valley Railroad Company, which is set for trial on Tuesday, and I
understand that for the solution of questions of this kind the courts look
to the Department of State for information.
Sincerely yours,
LINDLEY M. GARmisoN."
On February 19th, 1923, the Secretary of State, replying to this
inquiry, wrote:
"Department of State, Washington,
February 19, 1923.
My Dear Judge Garrison:
In reply to the inquiry contained in your letter of February 17, 1923,
and to certain additional inquiries made orally to-day by your partner,
Mr. Raoul E. Desvernine, I have to inform you that the so-called -pro-
visional government of Russia, which succeeded to authority upon the
abdication of the Czar, was recognized by the government of the United
States on March 22, 1917. On July 5 of the same year Mr. Boris
Bakhmetieff was received by the President as the ambassador extraor-
dinary and plenipotentiary 'of the newly recognized government.
Mr. Bakhmetieff continued to be recognized as the ambassador of
Russia to the United States until June 3
o, 1922. The custody of the
property of the Russian government in this country, for which Mr.
Bakhmetieff had been responsible, was, after the date of his retirement,
considered to vest in Mr. Serge Ughet, the financial attache of the Rus-
sian embassy, whose diplomatic status with this government was not
considered to be altered by the termination of the ambassador's duties.
In answer specifically to your questions, I may say that the United
States has not recognized any othei, government in Russia since the fall
of the provisional government, to which reference is made above.
The regime now functioning in Russia, and known as the 'Soviet
Regime,' has not been recognized by the United States.
Sincerely yours,
CHARLES E. HUGHES.
Hon. Lindley M. Garrison,
No. 24 Broad Street,
New York City."
It is important to note that the Secretary refers to the "fall of the
provisional government," which, as a matter of public knowledge,
occurred through the expulsion or imprisonment of its ministers early
in November, 1917, and was consummated by the forcible dispersement
of the constituent assembly on December 13th, 1917. The Secretary
further states that the United States has not recognized any other gov-
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ernment in Russia since the fall of the Provisional Government, and
states specifically that the United States has not recognized "the regime
now functioning in Russia, and known as the 'Soviet Regime." From
these statements it is apparent that the executive has not chosen to
regard the present regime in Russia as no government at all. The
absurd and impossible conclusion that during a period of over seven
years Russia has been totally devoid of law, is not to be lightly imputed
to the responsible officers of our government.
It may perhaps be thought that the continued reception of the diplo-
matic agents of the Provisional Government is necessarily a determina-
tion by our own government that no goverment has existed in Russia
since the fall of the Provisional Government, and in this connection not
only the correspondence above quoted but the decision in Russian Gov-
ernment v. Lehigh Valley R.RY may be referred to, where it was held
that an action commenced by the accredited ambassador "of the Provi-
sional Russian Government after the fall of that government was prop-
erly commenced, and could be maintained and continued by one of his
subordinates whose diplomatic status was not considered by the execu-
tive to have been altered, and in whom our government considered that
the custody of the property of the Russian Government in this country
had been vested. (See correspondence heretofore quoted.) The
theory of the decision was not that the Provisional Russian Government
continues to function in Russia, but that the real party in interest was
the State of Russia, and that Russia, the state, still lives, and is a con-
tinuing entity in contemplation of law. The court said:
"The question suggesting itself is: how can Mr. Ughet represent a
government which has fallen? The answer is that the provisional gov-
ernment had fallen when Mr. Bakhmetieff began the suits, and they are
held to have been properly begun, for the reason that at the time our
government recognized him as such ambassador, and the court is bound
by the action of our government, and so, regardless as to whether or
not that government may have fallen, if our government considers this
'financial attache of the Russian embassy, whose diplomatic status with
this government was not considered to be altered,' to have become vested
with the custody of the property of the Russian government after Mr.
Bakhmetieff's retirement, I think that it is conclusive with the court,
and that in this capacity the plaintiff may prosecute these suits. No
precedent for such a situation has been presented to me, and I have not
been able to find one. I feel, however, that our government may have
adopted this plan for the purpose of preventing what otherwise would
have been a loss of rights to Russia, because of its refusal, to recognize
the present regime now functioning in Russia, and I come more readily
to the conclusion that I do, for I realize how highly important it is that
the rights of Russia shall not be lost in this manner."
It is clear that the state must be distinguished from its government.
The existence of the state as a nation is regarded as continuous, no mat-
'Supra note 2.
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ter what revolutionary changes may occur in its government. Revo-
lution does not destroy the state, although it may disrupt and destroy
its government.10 If, in the course of revolution, the old regime is
utterly destroyed, nevertheless until the new regime is recognizet the
diplomatic representatives accredited by the old regime may continue
at their posts in foreign countries as representatives, not of the govern-
ment which has ceased to exist, but of the state, which continues to exist
regardless of revolutionary change.
The history of our government's dealings with Ambassador Bakhme-
tieff and his recognized successor as custodian of Russian government
property, Mr. Serge Ughet, discloses to what limits this fiction has been
carried. Senate Document No. 86, 67th Congress, Second Session, con-
tains a record of these transactions, from which it appears that after the
fall of the Provisional Government Mr. Bakhmetieff, in his capacity as
Russian Ambassador, and Mr. Ughet, the Financial Attache of the
Russian Embassy, received from the Navy Department moneys payable
to the Russian State for charter hire, and entered into a contract in the
name of the Russian GCovernment with the War Department for the
purchase of war supplies and munitions, depositing one million dollars
worth of gold shipped from Vladivostok on a United States army trans-
port as security to guarantee payment by the Russian Government under
this contract. When, by reason of the fall of the Kolchak Government,-
this contract could not be performed, a portion of the gold was paid to
the War Department and the balance' to the National City Bank "for
Russian Government."
In a memorandum of a conference between Mr. Ughet and a repre-
sentative of our State Department appearing in this document, at page
173, the following appears:
"Mr. Ughet pointed out that before the dissolution of the Kolchak
government he had been authorized by that government to dispose of
funds for purposes helpful to Denekin or Wrangel in South Russia.
I explained to him that we doubted whether such authorization would
protect him now that his former principal, the Kolchak government, had
dissolved.
I brought up the question of the million dollars held as security by
the War Department. I notified him that we considered that (i) these
were funds brought officially to the notice of the Government on account
of their having been held by the Government, that (2) the contract was
made in behalf of the Zussian Government, and (3) the situation had
now changed and his formerly existing principal, the Kolchak govern-
ment, which we had approved, had now dissolved. For these reasons
we felt that the sum should be either held by the War Department or
deposited in the liquidation account. This was accepted without any
protest on his part."
Payments were also made by the Shipping Board to Mr. Bakhmetieff
through Mr. Ughet of sums due to the Russian Government for charter
10 The Sapphire (187o, U. S.) ii Wall. 164.
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hire of Russian ships. It is not necessary to detail these transactions
more fully. They are set out in the document referred to, which was
printed December 6, I92i," and which discloses that our government
consistently dealt with Mr. Bakhmetieff, not as the representative of the
Provisional Government, which had ceased to exist, but as the accred-
ited diplomatic representative of the Russian state or nation as distin-
guished from any government existing or theretofore existing.
Until there is some definite determination by the executive that the
Soviet Government is to be regarded as no government at all, it seems
clear that neither its non-recognition nor the continuance of the author-
ity of the diplomatic agents of the Provisional Government precludes
the courts from considering that the Soviet Government is in fact a
government ruling by paramount force."
What effect, then, may the courts give to the laws of a foreign gov-
ernment which has not been recognized by the executive, but which, as
a matter of common knowledge, is ruling through the exercise of para-
mount force? The question is not novel, and has been dealt with in a
number of decisions of the Supreme Court, one of the latest of which
is found in MacLeod v. United States.' 2 * In that case the plaintiff, on
January 29, 1899, imported into the Island of Cebu, in the Philippine
Islands, a cargo of rice, upon which he was required to pay duties to
the native government, the native inhabitants, formerly in insurrection
against Spain, having taken complete possession of the Island in Decem-
ber, 1898, formed a so-called republic, and administered the affairs of
the Island until possession was surrendered to the United States on
February 22, 1899. Thereafter the plaintiff was required by the Col-
lector of Customs at Manila to pay duties upon the same cargo to the
United States, and suit was brought in the Court of Claims to recover
the amount of this payment. Although the native government had
never in any way been recognized by the United States, the Supreme
Court held that this government was of the class of de facto govern-
ments described in Thorington v. Smith' as follows:
"But there is another description of government, called also by pub-
licists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly
denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing
Certain cases have arisen out of the Russian situation dealing with govern-
mental rights or diplomatic representation which are not pertinent to this ques-
tion. It has been held that the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic
cannot maintain an action in our courts. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
Republie v. Cibrario (1923) 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259; The Penza (1921,
E. D. N. Y.) 277 Fed. 91. Nor can an unrecognized government be sued as a
defendant. Wulfsohn v. Russian Republic, supra note I; Nankivel v. Onsk All
Russian Government (1923) 237 N. Y. i5o, 142 N. E. 569.
(913) 229 U. S. 416, 33 Sup. Ct. 955.
(1868, U. S.) 8 Wall. I, 9; see e.g. COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE LAW jouRNAL,
565
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charcteristics are (i), that its existence is maintained by active military
power, within the territories, and against the rightful authority of an
established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists, it
must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by
acts of obedience, rendered in submission to such force, do not become
responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the
laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are
established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions.
They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they
may be administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less
directly by military force."
It was held that the tariff duties upon the cargo of rice were paid to
the de facto authorities at Cebu, and the payment made to the United
States at Manila was not a tariff duty, but an illegal and an unwar-
ranted exaction in the nature of a penalty. While the case turned upon
the construction of orders of the President, the court clearly recognized
that the assessment of duties by the native government imposed upon
the plaintiff not only the necessity, but the duty of payment because the
native government was clearly entitled at least to the status of "a gov-
ernment of paramount force." In this decision reliance was placed upon
the Mazatlan case and the Bluefields case, accounts of which appear in
i Moore, International Law Digest (19o6) 49 et seq. In the latter
case the then Secretary of State, Mr. Fish, in his instructions to our
Minister to Mexico regarding the exaction of duties previously paid to
insurgents, said:
"The obligation of obedience to a government in a particular place in
a country may be regarded as suspended, at least, when its authority is
usurped, and is due to the usurpers if they choose to exercise it."
Perhaps of even more pertinence is the ruling of the Supreme Court
in United States v. Rice.14 During the war of 1812 the port of Castine,
Maine, was occupied by the British forces, under whose rule the British
Government exercised full civil and military authority over the inhabi-
tants, establishing custom houses and collecting duties on imports.
After the re-establishment of the American Government in Castine the
Collector of Customs claimed the right to collect duties upon imports for
which duties had already been paid to the British authorities during the
period of their occupation. In commenting upon the situation Mr.
Justice Story, writing the opinion of the court, said :"5
"By the conquest and military occupation of Castine, the enemy
acquired that firm possession which enabled him to exercise the fullest
rights of sovereignty over that place. The sovereignty of the United
States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the
United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obliga-
tory upon the inhabitants who remained, and submitted to the conquerors.
8 (1819, U. S.) 4 Wheat. 246.
I5 ibid. at p. 254.
.5o6
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By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to
the British Government, and were bound by such laws, and such only,
as it chose to recognize and impose. From the nature of the case, no
other laws could be obligatory upon them, for where there is no pro-
tection or allegiance or sovereignty, there can be no claim to obedience."
In speaking of the Confederate Government in the case of Thoring-
ton v. Smith,16 the Supreme Court said that although this government
was never recognized by the United States as a de facto government,
its status was such as to make obedience to its authority in civil and
local matters not only a. necessity, but a duty, and that without such
obedience civil order was impossible.
Mr. Warren, in his history of the Supreme Court, speaking of the
litigation before the Supreme Court involving the status of the Con-
federacy, says :1
7
'"The legal status of the Confederate States and of their legislation
during the war was settled by the Court as early as 1870, in Hickman
v. Jones, 9 Wall. 197, in which it held the Confederate Government
to be 'simply an armed resistance to the rightful authority of the
sovereign'; and all its acts were held invalid so far as they were in aid
of the rebellion. While the more radical Republican leaders were
insistent that all legislation of every kind enacted by the various States
of the Confederacy were illegal and void, the Court took a more con-
servative and rational view; and in Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570,
in 1873, it decided that the acts of the several Confederate States 'so
far as they did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the
National authority or the just rights of citizens under the Constitution,
are, in general, to be treated as valid and binding. The existence of
a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society
or do away with civil government.'"
In a number of cases the courts recognized the validity of certain
acts of the several states of the Confederacy or of their officers or
under their authority. 8 On the other hand, the courts refused to
give any legal effect to the acts of the Confederacy which were in aid
of the rebellion.' 9
"'Supra note 13.
173 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History (1922) 139.
" Thorington v. Smith,. supra note I3; United States v. Insurance Companies
(1874, U. S.) 22 Wall. 99; Keith v. Clark (1874) 97 U. S. 454; United States
v. Thomas (1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 337; Baldy v. Hunter (1898) 171 U. S. 388;
Snodgrass v. Adams (1874) 26 La. Ann. 235; Lay v. O'Neil (1877) 29 La. Ann.
722; Sharkey v. Bankston (1878) 30 La. Ann. 891; Hill v. Boyland (1866) 40
Miss. 618; Lewis v. -Hearne (1871) 34 -Tex. 382; Hubbard Co. v. Harnden
Express Co. (1872) 1O R. I. 244; Dillard v. Alexander (1872, Tenn.) 9 Heisk.
719.
"Horn v. Lockhart (1873, U. S.) 17 Wall. 570; Williams v. Bruffy (1877)
96 U. S. 176; Lamar v. Micou (1884) 112 U. S. 452; Sprott v. United States
(1874, U. S.) 20 Wall. 459; Texas v. White (1868, U. S.) 7 Wall. 700; Hick-
man v. Jones? (1869, U. S.) 9 Wall. 197; Hananer v. Doane (1870, U. S.) 12
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Certainly if the laws of a government of paramount force formed
in open rebellion against the government of the United States are
entitled to be treated as valid and binding in our courts in the deter-
mination of private and civil rights, there can be no reason for refusing
under similar circumstances to enforce the decrees of the Soviet Govern-
ment. In the Sokoloff case, supra, the court said in referring to the
cases dealing with the laws of the Confederacy:
"In those litigations acts or decrees of the rebellious governments,
which, of course, had not been recognized as governments de facto,
were held to be nullities when they worked injustice to citizens of the
Union or were in conflict with its public policy. On the other hand, acts
or decrees that were just in operation and consistent with public policy,
were sustained not infrequently to the same extent as if the govern-
ments were lawful. These analogies suggest the thought that, subject
to like restrictions, effect may at times be due to the ordinances of
foreign governments which, though formally unrecognized, have
notoriously an existence as governments de facto. Consequences
appropriate enough when recognition is withheld on the ground that
rival factions are still contending for the mastery, may be in need
of readjustment before they can be fitted to the practice, now a grow-
ing one, of withholding recognition whenever it is thought that a
government, functioning unhampered, is unworthy of a place in the
society of nations. Limitations upon the general rule may he appro-
priate for the protection of one who has been the victim of spoliation,
though they would be refused to the spoliator or to others claiming
under him. We leave these questions open. At the utmost, they
suggest the possibility that a body or group which has vindicated by
the course of events its pretentions to sovereign power, but which has
forfeited by its conduct the privileges or immunities of sovereignty,
may gain for its acts and decrees a validity quasi-governmental, if
violence to fundamental principles of justice or to our own public
policy might otherwise be done."
These suggestions of the Court of Appeals are directly in conflict
with the opinions of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
New York in the First Department.
20
In these cases it was claimed that the plaintiff or defendant corpora-
tions organized under Russian law had been dissolved by Soviet decree.
In the Jamves case, on the second appeal the court said :21
"The various 'Decrees of Peoples Commissaries' issued by the Soviet
regime have been held to be of no force in this jurisdiction because
Wall. 342; Legal Tender Cases, Knox v. Lee (I870,, U. S.) 12 Wall. 457;
Hanauer v. Woodruff (1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 439; Cornett v. Williams (1873,
U. S.) 2o Wail. 226; Dewing v. Perdicaries (1877) 96 U.'S. 193.
"atames & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co. (1924, ist Dept.) 2o8 App. Div.
141, 2o3 N. Y. Supp. 232; s. C. (1924) 21o App. Div. 82, 205 N. Y. Siipp. 472;
Joint Stock Co. of Volgakama 0. & C. Factory v. National City Bank (1924,
App. Div. ist Dept.) 206 N. Y. Supp. 476.
= 21o App. Div. at p. 83, 205 N. Y. Supp. at p. 473.
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of the non-recognition, by our federal authorities who carry on our
diplomatic intercourse, of the ruling body in Russia promulgating
these decrees."
The same court, in an opinion by the same judge in the Volgakama
case, supra, said :22
"The affidavit supporting plaintiff's application shows that no
Russian government has exercised any function in Russia since Novem-
ber, 1917, except the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.
Indeed, as a historical fact the court may take judicial notice of this
event even in the absence of actual proof. The allegations then in
effect are that the corporate existence of the plaintiff was terminated
by some act or decree of the present unrecognized Soviet government
of Russia. * * *
But though competent proof were made which definitely established
the fact that the corporate existence of the plaintiff was terminated
by any act or decree of the Soviet government of Russia, such proof
would not be considered by the courts in this country, as has been
often latterly decided in New York tribunals and in federal
judicatories."
The James case,2" second appeal, has been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals24 but the refusal of the court to give effect to the Soviet decrees
of dissolution was not, as in the Appellate Division, based simply upon
"the non-recognition, by our Federal authorities who carry on our
diplomatic intercourse, of the ruling body in Russia promulgating these
decrees." The court decided that neither the national public policy nor
any consideration of justice and equity required it to hold the defendant
not amenable to the process of our courts. 25 In the opinion of the
court by judge Cardozo it was said:
"We do not say that a government unrecognized by ours will always
be viewed as non-existent by our courts though the sole question at
issue has to do with a transaction between the unrecognized govern-
ment and a citizen or subject of a government by which recognition has
been given."
Under the precedents to which reference has certainly been made non-
recognition has certainly not been heretofore regarded as a sufficient
reason for regarding as utterly void and of no legal effect the laws of an
unrecognized government ruling by paramount force such as the Soviet
regime in Russia is conceded to be.
S206 N. Y. Supp. at p. 480.
"Supra note 21.
"N. Y. Ct. of Appeals (Jan. 21, 1925).
"The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York in the Third
Department in the case of Russian Reinsurance Company v. Stoddard (1925)
211 App. Div. 132, decided that the Soviet decrees of dissolution had not destroyed
the right of the plaintiff corporation organized under Russian law to sue in our
courts, stating in its opinion that neither necessity nor justice required the court
to deny the plaintiff the right to sue.
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The true rule is undoubtedly stated in the dictum of Judge Cardozo
in the Sokoloff case supra. Surely there can be no reason or justice in
refusing to give any validity whatsoever to those laws of Russia upon
which questions of purely private right and obligation must of necessity
depend, provided that the courts do not, in so doing, undertake to
reverse the determinations actually made by the executive in declaring
the foreign policies of this government. The refusal of diplomatic
intercourse for reasons of state policy in the nature of things does not
touch the question of private right dependent upon the internal opera-
tions of Russian law. If recognition of foreign governments actually
exercising sovereign powers is to be withheld long after all other author-
ities have been driven out, as in thd case of Russia, the laws of the new
regime, in so far as they have in fact operated in the creation of strictly
private rights and obligations, must of necessity be given effect if
those rights and obligations are to be determined in our courts. To
close our courts to the determination of such questions or to require
our judges to determine these rights and obligations according to the
laws of the old regime, which in fact did not function in their creation,
leads to the denial or distortion of private rights absurdly incompatible
with the ends .of justice. It is to be hoped that the courtq, in dealing
with this question, will follow the rule stated in the dictum of Judge
Cardozo in the Sokoloff case supra, and the well-considered decisions
of the Supreme Court dealing with the laws of the Confederacy.
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